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ABSTRACT: The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is 
reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s 
conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially, 
it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, 
which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity required. Dis-
crete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand 
in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, im-
mediate nextness of a point to a certain other. In this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step 
indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point 
that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of dis-
continuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are dis-
crepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently 
the consequence of one. 
Keywords: Zeno, infinite divisibility, photons, quanta, space, quantized levels, discontinuity, indeterminacy, Planck, 
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1. The Family Resemblance View of QM 
One of the main reasons why one cannot grasp “the meaning” of quantum mechanics 
(QM), is that there is no such thing as the meaning of QM. Its principles and theorems 
bifurcate so that, looking at them, one is strangely reminded of Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblances (1968, § 66, ff), as the splitting varieties of use of what initially appeared 
to be a single word, yet now applied to different cases. 
 There are family resemblances between one derivation of the uncertainties and an-
other, incompatible resemblances at that (Heisenberg 1958, p. 49, as opposed to 
Heisenberg 1949, pp. 21-23; and Heisenberg 1949 p. 21 as opposed to op. cit. p. 23!)1, 
hence incompatible versions of complementarity, a family resemblance between 
Bohrian Wholeness, which is proximal, and Nonlocality, which is a distant wholeness, 
and between one QM and another! For the ‘family’ contains even this. The violation 
                                                     
1 In his 1958, the photon “pushes(!) the electron” (p. 49), leading to ∆p∆q ≥ h. This ‘derivation’, due to (in-
famous) disturbance, whose interference alone prevents the joint determination of p and q, otherwise 
mutually compatible, is inaugurated in 1949, p. 21. But in that same work , two pages below, 
∆p∆q ≥ h is derived from de Broglie’s relation, p = h/λ, where now p is determined by the wave, mak-
ing the two variables logically incompatible instead. The sole resemblance between them is the result-
ing (?) ∆p∆q ≥ h itself, which then, considering, is more of a resemblance by sheer accident than one 
by ties of family. 
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of Bell’s Inequality implies that QM can either be local, L, but then not causal, –C, or 
causal, C, but then not local, –L. (Plotnitksy, 1994, p. 153). But not both at once. Of 
course, these two alternatives, QM as L & –C and QM as C & –L, are contradictories 
for both conjuncts involved, but they are both handsomely concealed under a single 
formalism; QM. One wonders, whether even a notion as flexible and permissible as 
that of family resemblances can make room even for that.  
 The family resemblance, if any, that I will be concerned with is even more generic 
than any of the previous. But certainly not less deserving of the “family” title (and its 
inherent ambiguity). We get a first taste of it in Bohm’s following distinction, clear 
enough to place the matter in its proper perspective: 
Energy appeared to have a certain atomicity both in the form of light quanta and in the discrete al-
lowed energy levels for matter. (Bohm 1957, p. 78) 
This is the family resemblance, or lack of one, that I will subsequently investigate. 
2. No nextness. The relevance of Zeno 
In a number of recent works of mine (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2007) I have been attempt-
ing to apply the concept of quantum discontinuity to Zeno’s paradoxes, as a plausible 
solution. I will briefly state the reasons which prompted this approach. In the Stadium 
Paradox, sufficient to our purposes, Zeno lays down two premises: 
[1] No distance can be crossed, unless all the (smaller) distances comprising it are 
crossed first. This is the premise of logical order. 
[2] A distance is always comprised of (smaller) distances, which are infinite in number. 
This is the premise of infinite divisibility. 
On their combined presence, Zeno validly proceeds to derive that 
[3] No distance can be crossed. (Therefore, nothing moves.) 
 The premise of logical priority is of considerable importance to the cogency of the 
argument. I cannot eat five bites out of my steak, unless I eat the first bite first. This is 
a matter of strict logical order. The fifth bite has to “wait upon” the first one, as it 
were, and all of the preceding four, in other words, wait for its turn. Analogously, if an 
infinity of smaller steps has to interfere and precede, prior to taking any step, no step 
can be taken. And so no distance can be crossed, for any crossing of it will have to be 
indefinitely postponed; any crossing will have to wait upon a previous and that, in turn, 
upon a previous still —if there is no limit to their diminution. All prospective steps to 
take, if perpetually having to yield their place to preceding ones, and so on for ever, 
are simply steps whose own turn will never arrive. So no step can be taken. (So, noth-
ing moves.) 
 Putting the point with distances, rather than with steps (a serious difference this, 
by all accounts —see below), if, before crossing any distance, one must first cross all 
the smaller distances contained in it, and these are infinite in number, either one can 
cross an infinity of distances, or one cannot cross any distance. Zeno rightfully denies 
the former possibility, and so is led to conclude that nothing moves. 
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 The first thing that comes to mind in this strangulating setting, is to directly dis-
pute, whether there are infinitely many smaller distances really contained in a distance, 
or, analogously, infinitely many smaller steps really contained in a step. Namely, to 
dispute Premise [2]. This is how Ancient Atomism came into being: 
A much more decisive impact of Zeno’s work [...] is evident in the atomism of Leucippus and 
Democritus. (Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1983, p. 279) 
And according to yet another, equally reliable source, “paradoxes such as Zeno’s were 
used as arguments in favour of atomism” (Sorabji 1983, p. 337). So far so good. Some 
form of atomism is clearly a way out of the Paradoxes. But Ancient Atomism is basi-
cally an objection against the infinite divisibility of bodies. And Zeno’s arguments are 
against the infinite divisibility of processes. A family resemblance there may well exist 
between them but, having seen what those are like, caution should be exercised. I 
might say that quantum discontinuity is a way out of the Paradoxes and you might be 
thinking, say, of Einstein’s photons, when you hear me say this, since they too are a 
form of atomicity, though only a form of one, as Bohm’s passage reveals. And then all 
further communication between us will abruptly break down. You simply cannot see, 
what possible relevance there is between Zeno’s problem and the discontinuity of one 
photon to another. This is exactly what happened between Prof. Joseph Alper and 
myself:  
Zeno’s paradox cannot be explained by quantum mechanics. More strongly, the paradox cannot 
even be stated in quantum mechanical terms.2
Different people mean different things by the same word, the eternal reason behind all 
family resemblances, if there ever was one. Einstein’s conception of photon disconti-
nuity does not have a relevance to Zeno. The problem is, however, that it does not 
have much relevance with Planck’s quantum either, which was what I meant, when I 
spoke of discontinuity. This is the whole point of introducing Zeno’s Paradoxes in the 
present connection, to begin with. If one kind of quantum discontinuity can offer a 
direct response to Zeno’s Paradoxes, while another kind is simply irrelevant to them, 
one kind of quantum discontinuity is just irrelevant to the other or, more, too unlike 
the other to even belong to the same theory.  
 So we had best get clear, before proceeding, what sort of discontinuity is the one 
required for rebutting Zeno. Whether or not this is the one that QM provides, can 
then be decided in retrospection. A continuous line, as we ordinarily tend to conceive 
it, is a line which is packed with infinitely many points. This being the case, there is no 
point that is authentically next to any other. How close, then, is a point of such a line to 
its ‘next’? Zeno’s reply is that, if the line is continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible, there is 
no point that is authentically next to any other. 
 So the answer all but spells itself. Introduce a point that is really a next point. Then 
the Stadium Runner can naturally progress to such a point, the very first stepping stone, 
as it were, and thus move —discontinuously. Were I requested to start counting from 
the start, I would go “one, two, three &c”. No problem. Yet were I requested to start 
                                                     
2 Report on my work (2004b) for the Journal of Philosophical Research, October 11, 2006, signed by Joseph 
Alper, in which the author expresses his wish to receive my reaction to his comments. This is it. 
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counting decimals from the start, how exactly could I start? There is no place to start 
counting, if naturals yield their place to decimals. Zeno’s Runner faces the exact same 
problem with taking a step, if motion is continuous. There is just no place for him to 
start. Hence, some notion of direct nextness is definitely required.3 The question is, 
whether QM furnishes the requisite sort or some other, unsuitable. Or, for that mat-
ter, how many sorts it does furnish in the first place. 
 The historical evidence in favour of an atomistic reply to Zeno’s riddles of motion 
is overwhelming. And the historical is, because the logical is. It makes sense to re-
spond to them thus, provided one can make sense of them to begin with. In their 
search of a point that is really next to another point, McLaughlin and Miller (1992), 
and Harrison (1996) choose to quantize the space, which the Runner has to cross. I, by 
contrast, quantized the motion that he has to perform. But some family of discontinuity 
or other was mutually deemed to be relevant. 
 I chose discontinuity of motion from the family, because (a) the laws of spacetime 
per se were thus left intact, as intact indeed as QM preserves them (Gavroglou 1989, p. 
551), (b) because discrete space points must be kept separate, which they cannot do, if 
there is no space in-between them to keep them separate, (c) because, if the Tortoise 
travels over dimensionless points, she will be crossing them in zero time and so the trail-
ing Achilles would never overtake her in any case. I concluded that our sole option 
was to quantize Achilles’s, or the Runner’s, motion.  
 Zeno had a tacit assumption here, which has gone unnoticed by nearly every one 
concerned. He freely assumed that crossing a particular part of space must itself be 
conducted “as-space”. Namely, only in ways matching the structure of space. This 
means that a body moving through space must either copy the rules of space, or else 
stay put. QM, which has quantized only the dynamical quantities, E and p, and their 
action yielding products, Et and pq, but not spacetime, is one definite evidence to the 
contrary. But there is one other version of the point, belonging to Henry Bergson, 
that is really worth quoting: 
The motion which Zeno attributes to Achilles would indeed be equivalent with the one he really 
performs, if and only if one has the right to treat motion, as he can treat the distance travelled, that is 
to say, as composable and decomposable at will. Once this paralogism is accepted, all the rest will 
but follow. (Bergson 1907; the greek translation, 1925) 
So here is yet another philosopher, proposing that we preserve the undivided unity of 
motion, its “wholeness”, as Bohr would put it, or its “duration”, as Bergson himself 
would, in the long line of thinkers introducing atomism for confronting Zeno. Only 
Prof. Alper thinks that Zeno’s paradoxes cannot even be stated in QM terms. 
                                                     
3 Zeno construes, “if there is continuity, then there is no nextness” (and so no motion), as a logical truth. 
This is made apparent in his Paradox of Extension: “How can a line of finite length be divided into 
infinitely many parts of finite length? And how can a line made up of lengthless parts add up to a line 
that has length?” (in Harrison 1996, p. 273). There is hardly a more pressing demand for the intro-
duction of Atomism than the previous. One cannot pile together lengthless parts, i.e. points, however 
many, and come up with a line that has length. In fact, Zeno’s point is that contiguous points cannot 
make up a line. They just simply are too close, ultimately collapsing to one, solitary point. (Hence, noth-
ing moves. For to move, you need two points.) 
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3. Einstein’s “true discontinuity” 
If there’s any value in later Wittgenstein philosophy, with its language games and fam-
ily resemblances, this lies in its warning against too much generality. In utter opposi-
tion to this tendency, physicists crave but for the theory which would unify the very 
universe, if possible. They have an eye only for unity, none for diversity. So they ig-
nore it, even when they see it. Prof. Alper is no exception (op. cit.): 
Einstein did not reject discontinuity. In fact, it was Einstein —not Planck— who invented the idea 
of the photon and fully realized the discontinuity it entailed. 
The difference is spotted but, presumably, transcended for the sake of greater unity. It 
is therefore instructive to see, how fully indeed did Einstein realize the discontinuity 
inherent in the idea of the photon:  
 The mining of coal from a coal mine can be conducted in a continuous manner. The amount of 
coal excavated can increase or decrease in smaller and yet smaller amounts, without any restric-
tion. But the number of coal miners, working in the mine, can only change in discontinuous fash-
ion. It would be sheer absurdity to say that since yesterday the number of miners increased by 
3,273. (Einstein & Infeld 1959) 
This “fully realized” discontinuity (you may put the inverted comas over the latter 
word no less, if you so desire), is subsequently integrated thus: 
 We can regard the mass of sand on a beach as continuous, even though the granular composi-
tion of the sand is evident. Yet in essence the mass of sand can vary only by integer multiples of 
the mass of a single grain. The mass of this grain would then be our elementary quantum(!). From 
this example we see that the discontinuous character of a quantity hitherto considered as con-
tinuous, may be uncovered, if we augment the accuracy of our measurements. We must allow 
that certain physical quantities, so far considered as continuous, may turn out to consist of ele-
mentary quanta. (Ibid.) 
What a full realization of discontinuity indeed. Quantum discontinuity, the one so 
fully realized, is declared tantamount to people ‘discontinuity’, or grains of sand discon-
tinuity, or birds-in-a-flock discontinuity. So where’s the problem? Quantization of en-
ergy is hardly any different than people discontinuity, or bird discontinuity. 
 What the problem is, I would think, is that people ‘discontinuity’, if that’s the word 
for this unfortunate idea, or grain of sand discontinuity, or bird discontinuity, are one 
and all instances of magnitudes that are discrete by definition. Miners coming out of the 
mine are self-evidently discrete in number. In other words, discrete a priori or, if you 
prefer, necessarily discrete. Hence, their discreteness is an utter triviality. To compare 
this with energy discreteness, the anomaly of the century, is not quite to the point, is it? 
For energy discreteness is anything but self-evident and anything but discrete by defi-
nition. Energy should not have been discrete at all. If anything, it should have been 
continuous by definition. 
 It was this which prompted Bohr to speak of “the irrationality inherent in the quan-
tum postulate” (1934, pp. 10, 19, 54), the irrationality that energy was found to occur 
only at certain values, rather than at any value, as every one (classically) expected that 
it should. For Bohr understood its meaning, as he also did the meaning of miners, 
grains of sand or birds, for which he never spoke in similar terms. If anything, he is 
contrasting between the two cases.  
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 Let me then demonstrate, what Einstein has turned this amazing, and disconcert-
ing, discovery into, to be approvingly cosigned by Prof. Alper. A photon-emitting 
source is connected with a timer, which controls their emission at calculable intervals 
of our choice. A certain initial interval t is succeeded by a second, t/2, a third, t/4, and 
so on. Then, given that the speed of photons is a constant, to these decreasing inter-
vals of emission will correspond shorter and even shorter distances separating every 
photon from the next. Then, if the interval between a certain photon and the one suc-
ceeding it is reduced to a t → 0, their distance will be a vanishing quantity no less. Is 
this anything like quantized orbit discontinuity, which was my sense in replying to 
Zeno? No. That discontinuity is not a vanishing quantity at all, is it?  
 Compare, then, the two members of the family; Planck’s quantum with Einstein’s, 
which two (thankfully) Prof. Alper has also contrasted. Radiation trapped in a cavity 
(also referred to as a “black body”) produces a standing wave, so that Planck’s law, 
E = hν, is a law fixing the range of possible eigen-frequencies of this closed wave 
while in the cavity, in other words, its higher harmonics, as is the case with any other, 
similar, harmonic oscillator (e.g. a guitar string). And these can only be integer multi-
ples of the fundamental oscillation, since all to be inscribed within the rigid bounda-
ries of the cavity (wall to wall), or the length of the string, into which they simply have 
to fit. All other frequencies, producing wavelengths whose sum does not add up to the 
exact boundary length, are mathematically precluded and so, via E = hν, are the ener-
gies, or “eigen-states”, corresponding to them. If E ≈ ν, the energy of any harmonic 
oscillator, such as an atom, is quantized.  
 A reversal of Planck’s reasoning, leading to the above frequency-energy associa-
tion, may proceed in the following fashion. Let us allow that certain known absorp-
tion and emission phenomena are better understood, if we assume that they occur by 
discrete amounts only, a fact which Einstein also stresses (Einstein 1965, p. 368). 
Then given that such phenomena are observed only in the cases of harmonic oscilla-
tors, which manifest a comparable behaviour regarding the range of their permissible 
frequencies, those being analogously discrete, it all appears as if the energy of a certain 
radiation runs on exactly parallel lines with its frequency (rather than with its ampli-
tude, as was classically assumed). Hence, there seems to exist an analogy here, namely, 
the ratio of E/ν must be an invariant. This is how the quantum of action came into 
being. 
 Now the term “quantized” does not apply to the eigen-frequencies themselves. On 
their own they are but a pure mathematical phenomenon, indeed, a classical phe-
nomenon, known long before QM. But the energies corresponding to them, the ei-
gen-states, are anything but classical. For, mathematically, there shouldn’t be other 
frequencies besides the eigen-frequencies, in the first place. But, mathematically, and 
generally, there should always be other energies. What the quantum postulate ex-
cludes, therefore, in the introduction of such eigen-states, are other states.  
 This is no longer a “here-there” discontinuity. It is, by utter contrast, a “state-no 
state” discontinuity. And, at this point, why the full realization of discontinuity is the 
one in Einstein’s conception, rather than Planck’s, is becoming more and more ob-
scure by the minute. Light quanta (a hazardous term, if there ever was one) are drop-
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lets of concentrated energy, existing, let us say, scattered in space. And their ‘disconti-
nuity’ as trivial as that of any object standing apart from any other. E.g. miners or cars 
in the street. But Planck’s quanta are quantized energy levels, namely, entities which are 
only high or low, but otherwise not to be found anywhere in space (see section 4). 
Only the object in possession of them is.  
 And these are energy differences, or levels, of a single oscillator. But a single, soli-
tary oscillator, vibrating at discrete frequencies, and hence possessed of only discrete 
energies, though perfectly sufficient to the task, can no longer, in its solitude, be “fully 
discontinuous” with any other of its kin, or any other thing for that matter. And 
hence, on Einstenian standards, cannot be discontinuous at all. To introduce Ein-
stein’s ‘full’ concept of discontinuity, a discontinuity other than discrete level disconti-
nuity, we need to introduce at least two entities, e.g. two photons which, at least on 
Einsteinian standards, are truly and fully discontinuous to one another, since spatially 
distinct. But to do this with our solitary oscillator, manifesting a discontinuity all of its 
own, would be to treat it as spatially distinct to... itself. Since it is not so distinct, let us 
suppose, Einstein’s true and full concept of discontinuity is wholly inapplicable to it. 
But not so Planck’s. True enough, there are full discontinuities and other kinds. The 
trick is to know which is which. 
 The former, resting on variable distances, is expendable and can be diminished at 
will. (See my photon-emitting device.) The latter can do neither. Its levels are fixed 
and immutable. And, what is worse, in-between ‘discontinuities’ in space, there is al-
ways something; namely, space. And hence existence. But in-between discontinuous lev-
els there is... what? Space certainly isn’t, and further smaller levels aren’t either. So I 
would say it is the Void, had I meant to spook Prof. Alper.  
 Photon ‘discontinuity’ is harmless (classical!), because it can conceptually reach no 
further, than a number of things being separated by the mere space that stretches be-
tween them. But energy level discontinuity is hardly as harmless. For in-between such 
levels energy itself can no longer be even conserved. (Though it can, overall.) So Prof. 
Alper would much rather get the best of both worlds. Have true and full discontinuity 
together with the homey security of a merely spatial kind. And Einstein certainly of-
fers him abundant assistance in this direction: 
Phenomena connected with the emission of light are more readily understood if one assumes that 
the energy of light is discontinuously distributed in space. In accordance with the assumption to be 
considered here, the energy of a light ray is not continuously distributed over an increasing space but 
consists of a finite number of energy quanta which are localized at points in space. (Einstein 1965 
(1905), p. 368) 
Need more? (Then see op. cit., p. 373) One light quantum, or photon, is over here, 
one other is over there, so they are truly and fully discontinuous, exactly like miners or 
cars in the street are. Or exactly like I and my aunt are, even if nobody has so far come 
to realize, how fully discontinuous the two of us really were. 
 What a ‘discontinuity’ indeed! The space between any two such photons, as my 
photon-device argument shows, can obviously be traversed continuously. For their dis-
tinctness, unlike quantum distinctness, is merely a spatial distinctness and hence such 
as sets no obstacles, or limitations, on how to cross it. So it can, in principle, be 
crossed by going through all the (infinite) points separating them, that is to say, con-
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tinuously. What is more, for that exact same reason, there are no limits to how small 
the space that separates two photons, can be taken —my photon-device argument 
once again. We can view them drawn as close to one another or as far apart as we 
wish, eventually eliminating such “true and full” discontinuity altogether. Could any of 
all that happen to the other kind? 
 We know it cannot. For when de Broglie reobtained Bohr’s quantum conditions as 
higher harmonics of the fundamental orbit, directly applying Planck’s logic of standing 
waves to it, thus identifying each discrete electron orbit with a certain eigen-frequency, 
the orbital distances thus resulting could no longer be crossed continuously. Nor be made any 
smaller than the mathematics ever allowed. For if E ≈ ν, there can be no energy in-
between quantized orbits, viewed as higher harmonics, any more than there can be 
any frequency between them. Whereupon, assigning an intermediate energy to the 
electron now, lying at an intermediate post, would be to simply contradict E ≈ ν; that is 
to say, QM. Consequently, the space separating any two successive such orbits could 
not be crossed at all, strictly speaking, nor be taken as arbitrarily reducible. The elec-
tron could only be at the orbits (viz. the eigen states) and only at these orbits. Not be-
tween them. All other, putative orbits, are not points that the electron can step on. 
Only the next allowed orbit is.  
 And this, I submit, is quantum nextness. Which is a way out of Zeno’s paradoxes. 
The Runner’s absolutely first and irreducible stepping stone. The Runner’s first step 
need no longer be indefinitely postponed. There are no longer smaller distances, 
whose crossing must precede this crossing, which now is the crossing. He now has 
somewhere to go. It goes without saying, by contrast, that Einstein’s full discontinuity 
is impotent to even touch Zeno’s insights. His photons are separated by a crossable 
(= continuous) distance. There are still infinitely many possible places for the Runner 
to step on, all of them more and more proximal still, just before leaving the photon he 
stands on. So he cannot take the step. For there is no first step to take —yet. (See Bar-
nes 1982, p. 262.) But real quantum states (orbits) are not separated by a similar, con-
tinuously crossable distance. The Runner, standing on any such orbit, can now take a 
quantum leap, bringing him to an immediate next orbit. There is now a first step to 
take, there now does exist a place, indeed a unique place, to step on: Any next orbit. 
No more infinite postponment.  
 How he gets to that place, on the other hand, when being nowhere in-between, I 
have no answer for, nor does QM. Or, rather, not saying how, is what QM is (Gav-
roglou 1989, p. 551). But it is not the nature of motion I tried to resolve by taking re-
course to QM. Only its possibility. Understanding the former in the face of the Para-
doxes,4 or in the face of discontinuity, is a far far heavier task than that. 
 The fact that the Planck-Bohr type of quantization offers a definite way out of 
Zeno’s paradoxes, while Einstein’s quasi-quantization offers none, is evidence enough 
of their discrepancy. The present analysis, partly conducted in independence of the 
                                                     
4 Try this: “A moving thing moves either in the place where it is [= so it won’t be where it is], or in the 
place where it is not [= so it will be where it’s not]. Hence, nothing moves” (Vlastos 1995, p. 206, 
brackets mine). 
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paradoxes, though guided by their intrinsic drive, corroborates this conclusion. Either 
there are two authentic, yet profoundly discrepant types of quantization, sharing but a 
faint family resemblance, as a weaker formulation of my thesis, or there is but one 
such, as a stronger formulation of it. This paper is quite comfortable with either. But, 
be that as it may, there is still one and only one type of discontinuity. And that is cer-
tainly not Einstein’s, the sole Prof. Alper seems to have a grasp of. Were we to limit 
ourselves to it, we would have failed far worse, than just answering Zeno. 
4. Atoms of bodies and atoms of events: The horror vacui 
The case for the existence of atoms, a direct translation of Zeno’s Paradox of Exten-
sion, has as follows: Suppose that a finite body has an infinite number of parts. Now 
these parts are either of a certain size or else of no size. But in the former case the 
body would be infinite in size and in the latter of zero size, both of which are contra-
dictory to the assumption. Therefore a finite material body can only have a finite 
number of parts, that is to say atoms. Infinite divisibility of bodies and infinite divisi-
bility of processes both employ the same type of principles and the same type of re-
ductio ad absurdum on their force, up to a point. A finite step consisting of infinitely 
many smaller steps is as impossible as a finite body consisting of infinitely many sma-
ller bodies. But this is where all affinity ends. 
 If the components of a body are divided and pulled apart, existence will not be ne-
gated. They will now be just so many separate bodies occupying separate parts of 
space, like I and my aunt also do —and always did. Given the principle that no two 
material bodies can occupy the same region of space, their separation, far from being a 
mystery, is a triviality. It leaves everything exactly as it was before, only adding to the 
number of separate bodies occupying separate regions of space. But when it comes to 
the division and pullling apart the components of an event, the latter developing in 
time, things take a dramatic turn. Reality itself will be interrupted:  
According to the quantum postulate, every change in the energy of the atom is the result of a 
complete transition between two of its stationary states. It was evident that no explanation of the 
indivisibility of the transition processes could be given within the frame of the deterministic de-
scription. (Bohr 1958, p. 87) 
Discontinuities in time, therefore, as opposed to those of space (if there be any such), 
entail indeterminism in the strictest logical sense. An indivisible transition from sta-
tionary state 4 to stationary state 3 cannot be resolved into smaller units, e.g. 3,9999, 
3.9998 &c, for the quantum that separates them is indivisible. But it cannot be per-
formed in zero time either. Hence, during the transition no energy can be ascribed to the 
electron in consistency with the quantum postulate (Hooker 1971, p. 263). Such ques-
tions can never arise regarding the division of bodies. To therefore assume that an 
event developing by atomic steps in time can ever produce an analogy with a material 
body composed of atoms in space, betrays ignorance of the problem. Bohr was any-
thing but ignorant of it, though some others certainly seem to be. 
 If the transition is indivisible, then for the entirety of its duration, the electron will 
be in no state. Is it similarly true to say that, were a body subdivided in just so many 
parts, it or they would likewise be in no state? The notion of indeterminacy cannot 
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even apply to division in space. Hence, there is hardly a contrast greater than the one 
between discontinuities in time (events) and discontinuities in space (bodies). Real dis-
continuity, if one only knew where to look, cannot even be stated in terms of atomic-
ity of bodies. It is the property of a change, not one of space.  
 And energy in physics is not a vector. Hence, determinations of space cannot have any 
bearing on it. Now would Prof. Alper acknowledge that energy, however poorly it 
may be quantized in the Planck-Bohr model, if compared to his “full Einsteinian dis-
continuity”, is still quantized even so? I trust he would. Then, if energy is at all quan-
tized, and unrelated to any spatial attribute, Einstein’s true and full discontinuity, mul-
tiply described by himself as one that is “distributed in space” and “consisting of energy 
quanta at points in space”, in all, therefore, a thoroughly space-dependent discontinuity, 
is simply foreign to energy quantization properly so-called. The latter can only be cast 
in terms of level (or degree) discreteness, and cannot even relate to space in the con-
nection required. Prof. Alper has therefore done well to contrast Planck’s quantum to 
that of Einstein’s, if only he knew, what he was in fact contrasting it to. 
 The sole point of contact between Einstein’s light quanta, on the one hand, and 
the atomic structure of energy, on the other, as resulting from its quantization, is at 
best that of reason and consequence. It is because two successive and quantized energy 
levels yield as their difference a single limiting value, one indivisible quantum, that this 
quantum is released as a surplus of energy resulting from a quantized transition.  
 Now I am far from implying that this meeting point between Planck’s and Ein-
stein’s quantization is a trivial matter. It is simply to say that, despite the conditioned 
reflexes of a considerable number of physicists, the “light quantum” notion as an is-
tance or, worse, a model of discontinuity is mistaken. This is not what quantum dis-
continuity is. So we have to get our vocabulary correct. The indivisibility of an emitted 
photon is actually a consequence of quantization. Hence, not the prototype for it. It is 
derivative. Not primitive. And one cannot coherently afford to call a consequence of 
quantization the quantization. Perhaps, not even a quantization. Saying this would be 
no less absurd, or confused, than declaring the smoke to be the fire. Smoke may be a 
consequence of fire. But it is not the fire. Let alone the fire. 
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